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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents the means of user authentication 
in wireless networks when the strong network 
protection is required. It is also intended to help 
implement RADIUS user authentication on wireless 
networks in the environments where different 
operating systems are used. The concept of RADIUS 
authentication is explained along with procedures for 
connecting Wireless Access Points with GPL Linux 
firmware and Captive Portal to Microsoft’s Network 
Policy Server and Windows Server 2008 Active 
Directory users database. 
 
Index Terms – Wireless, Authentication, 
Accounting, RADIUS, LDAP, Active, Directory 
1. INTRODUCTION 
RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User 
Service) was originally established as a set rules and 
services for user authentication management in dial-
up, intranet and VPN networking environments. It 
gained much of its popularity in contemporary, 
widely spread wireless internet connections world. 
RADIUS protocol defines authentication, 
authorization and accounting (AAA) in centralized 
fashion. The RADIUS Authentication and 
Authorization are defined in RFC 2865 [1], while the 
Accounting part is defined in RFC 2866 [2]. 
Implementations of RADIUS specification vary and 
are vendor independent. There is an integrative 
Microsoft solution, various other proprietary and open 
source solutions. This paper tackles the problem of 
implementation of RADIUS server in corporate 
intranet wireless environment through combining 
Microsoft technology on the back-end side with an 
open source solution on the side of the access client 
and server.  
Situations like this one may be found in academic 
institutions, often open for experimenting with new 
solutions and technologies, and in public wireless 
networks. Academic institutions are the perfect 
example of heterogeneous environment and situation 
where RADIUS component can be located on a Linux 
platform, Microsoft Active Directory can be used as a 
LDAP base with student accounts and Data Base 
server could be MySQL on a Unix platform used for 
Accounting. 
2. THE RADIUS CONCEPT 
As a relatively simple client-server type protocol, 
RADIUS is responsible for user authentication, 
authorization and account management related to 
network accessing clients. It is designed to reside on a 
centrally positioned server and acts as a secure layer 
between network access points (typically IEEE 
802.11) and the back-end database of user accounts 
[3]. It is the network accessing client that initiates 
communication towards the RADIUS server, and the 
responses it gets include access permission or denial, 
depending on the evaluation of the connection request 
(defined by username and password, or a certificate 
the user provides). In addition, the server can 
determine the set of privileges to which the specific 
client (user) is authorized. There can also exist 
RADIUS proxies, assigned to route connection 
requests between other components, namely clients, 
servers and other RADIUS proxies. 
 
Figure 1. Various RADIUS implementations 
3.  THE PARTS OF RADIUS 
In general, a system using RADIUS includes access 
clients, access servers (which act as clients from the 
RADIUS point of view), RADIUS servers, user 
account databases and, optionally, RADIUS proxies, 
as shown in Fig. 1. 
An access client is any entity that connects to the 
network (e.g. LAN, VPN or intranet). An access 
server provides network access; this category includes 
wireless access points, switches and network access 
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servers (NASs). Access server acts as a client to 
RADIUS server by sending it connection requests and 
account-related messages. RADIUS server processes 
what is sent by its client (or RADIUS proxy) and 
decides on the connection of each user according to a 
set of rules. In early versions of RADIUS servers the 
data on users was kept in a file within the severs. 
Later versions introduced database access, detaching 
the user account database from the server, thus 
allowing the use of SQL, Kerberos, LDAP or Active 
Directory. User account database keeps record of user 
accounts and their properties – authorization and 
connection parameters. Routing of connection and 
accounting messages between servers and clients is 
provided by RADIUS proxies. This situation occurs 
when multiple RADIUS servers are used within the 
same network, or when RADIUS components from 
different vendors are used. Proxies can be chained, 
which, in turn, may result in somewhat ambiguous 
role distribution between components. 
The sequence of events triggered by reception of a 
connection request from the network accessing client 
begins with the RADIUS-enabled NAS creating an 
Access-Request Message and sending it to the 
RADIUS server. Server then evaluates the message 
and, if required, sends the Access-Challenge message 
(requiring more data on user) to the access server, to 
which the access server responds with a new Access-
Request message. RADIUS server accesses user 
account database, verifies user credentials and sends 
Access-Accept or Access-Reject message back. Upon 
receiving the message, if the connection is approved, 
completes the connection procedure and sends 
Accounting-Request message to the RADIUS server, 
to which it responds with the Accounting-Response 
message.  
4.  RADIUS MESSAGES 
RADIUS components communicate by six types of 
RADIUS messages, all sent by UDP protocol on ports 
1812 (authentication) and 1813 (accounting) by 
default. Clients use a dynamically allocated UDP port 
for both (in most cases this is configurable). Older 
versions use ports 1645 and 1646, respectively. TCP 
is not used. Access-Request type of message carries 
information that indentifies the network access client, 
credentials for authentication and optional special 
requirements. Once received by a RADIUS server, it 
is checked whether it comes from a known RADIUS 
client. Access-Challenge message type is the server's 
response when additional information about the 
accessing client is needed. Access-Accept informs the 
client that the user is authorized and authenticated, 
while Access-Reject denies the connection (e.g. if the 
account is not active). Accounting-Request and 
Accounting-Response are exchanged after the  
connection is approved. 
CODE         
IDENTIFIER         
LENGTH         
AUTHENTICATOR                 
ATTRIBUTES         
       
Figure 2. RADIUS message format 
 
RADIUS messages are sent using UDP where 
each UDP message contains one single RADIUS 
message. RADIUS messages have common structure, 
as shown in Figure 2. 
Code (1 byte) indicates RADIUS message type. 
Identifier value is created by the sender; this field 
enables the client (or the proxy) to match the 
responses with respective requests. Length field 
indicates the length of the entire RADIUS message, 
while Authenticator carries information about the 
RADIUS client (ensuring that client and server share 
the same Shared Secret) [4]. Attributes field is of 
variable size and contains attributes related to the 
specific user (e.g. authentication, authorization, 
information, configuration details for the messages 
etc). Attributes have the Type-Length-Value form 
(with the exception of vendor-specific attributes) and 
their order needs to be preserved if the message has 
multiple instances. 
5. TRAFFIC AND SECURITY ISSUES 
Due to interception and analysis susceptibility, 
RADIUS traffic needs to be secured, which includes 
Strong Shared Secrets, Message-Authenticator 
Attributes and Internet Protocol Security (IPSec). 
Strong Shared Secret authenticates RADIUS 
messages using the Authenticator field in the response 
message header and encrypts attributes. RFS 2865 
recommends full 128 bit information entropy. If 
keyboard characters (5.8 bits of entropy) are used, a 
random sequence should be no less than 22 characters 
long. Incoming Access-Request messages are not 
cryptographically verified by default (only the 
sender's IP address is verified), thus can be spoofed. 
To avoid this RADIUS server can require Message-
Authenticator attribute in order for data to be 
confidential across complete RADIUS message, 
IPSec should be implemented using Encryption 
Security Payload (ESP) and algorithms like Triple 
Data Encryption Standard (3DES). Possible attacker 
is, in this way, forced to decrypt IPSec protection of 
the message prior to analyzing its contents. 
6. IMPLEMENTATION MODELS 
 
Figure 3. Simple RADIUS implementation 
Depending on network infrastructure and different 
needs, RADIUS server may be implemented in 
different manners. One of the things that should be 
seriously  took into account is the type of the software 
installed in the network. Whether it is about Open 
Source solutions, Windows, or any other solution, the 
best help one can get is to have homogenous network. 
The biggest problem arises when trying to add 
RADIUS authentication to the existing Windows 
infrastructure. Slight differences in a way that 
RADIUS connects to Open LDAP, or Microsoft 
Active Directory user database make this task very 
difficult.  
One implementation involves completely Open 
Source solutions like Open LDAP as user’s database, 
FreeRADIUS as RADIUS server and any access point 
that support this kind of user authentication. When 
using this configuration, some users may experience 
problems after the installation of Microsoft Windows 
XP Service Pack 2 (SP2), where Protected Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (PEAP) connection does not 
authenticate successfully. This failure occurs during 
an authentication attempt to a third-party Remote 
Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) 
server. The cause of this problem lays in different 
method that third-party RADIUS server uses to 
calculate the Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP) Type:Length:Value format (EAP-TLV) id than 
the method that Windows XP uses [5]. 
Another use case would involve Microsoft Active 
Directory as LDAP users database, Wireless access 
points that support RADIUS authentication and 
finally Microsoft Internet Authentication Service 
(IAS) in Windows Server 2003, or new Network 
Policy Server (NPS) in Windows Server 2008 as a 
RADIUS instance. As described in Figure 3. After the 
client connects to access point, login dialog should be 
presented, so the user can enter their credentials. 
Those credentials are encrypted and sent via IAS or 
NPS RADIUS server to Active Directory (LDAP) for 
authentication.  
In this connection model, Linux users reported 
problems regarding the login dialog. Some Linux 
distributions do not show login dialog at all, denying 
the user Wi-Fi access.   
In order to avoid instantiation of a login dialog 
and any other problems connected to cross platform 
use, captive portal must be used. This portal is a 
simple web page that will be presented no matter what 
platform is used. 
7. UNIVERSAL SOLUTION 
The key for successful user authentication in networks 
which include both Linux and Windows Servers and 
Clients is the use of so called “Captive Portal”. The 
Login dialog’s been replaced with a CGI or PHP 
script that resides on a web server (shown in Fig. 4.) 
After successful connection to an Access Point, and 
immediately after starting any Web browser, the user 
is redirected to a web page, hosted on another web 
server which asks for user’s username and password. 
That way, no login dialog’s been activated and login 
process is Operating System independent [6].  
The only problem in this constellation is that too 
many servers are involved in a single user 
authentication process. Single request ends up at web 
server, RADIUS server, LDAP server and back. 
DHCP server is also involved, since after initial 
association with access point user gets one IP address, 
to keep him for going out of the so called “garden”. 
After the access’s been granted, DHCP server delivers 
new valid IP address to allow user internet access.  
To simplify login process it is useful to have 
access point, web server and DHCP server at one 
place. That’s where customized firmware may be 
used. Linksys’s WRT54GL is the most customizable 
Wireless Router ever built. Its own firmware is under 
GPL license, so there are various distributions that 
can be uploaded into device to suite specific needs. In 
this case the distribution of Open WRT -White 
 
Figure 4. Full RADIUS implementation with 
Captive Portal 
 Figure 5. Template User Account 
 
Figure 6. Reverse Encryption Filed 
Russian firmware called CoovaAP is perfect solution. 
Not only does it have built in web server, it already 
has several pre built login CGI scripts that can be 
customized. That way, after the access point 
association, user’s been internally redirected to a web 
server with IP address from local DHCP server , and 
after the user enters credentials, RADIUS server’s 
been contacted.  
This setup works very well when Free RADIUS 
and Open LDAP are used, but connection to an 
existing Active Directory infrastructure can be a 
problem, especially when connecting to the new 
Windows Server 2008.  
Since the typical situation includes already formed 
LDAP base with user account, and RADIUS comes as 
an extra it is necessary to connect RADIUS to 
existing infrastructure. In order to authenticate the 
user through Active Directory, several tweaks must be 
made. These tweaks are not obvious and are the result 
of excessive research. 
8. CHANGES IN ACTIVE DIRECTORY 
To authenticate users from Active Directory, several 
preparations have to be done. First, new group 
WiFiUsers has to be created. Only members of this 
group will be authenticated. Since the typical situation 
includes multiple accounts that have to be created, to 
simplify the user accounts creation process, one 
template account should be created. 
The creation of the template account is done in the 
exact same manner like any other user account with 
one slight difference. Fig. 5 explains the naming 
convention with asterisk in front of the account’s 
name, and account disabled checkbox which has to be 
checked. This way, simple right click and copy option 
over the template account will make copy which will 
require only basic data to be filled, and the account 
will be automatically member of designated Wi-Fi 
Users group.   
After the creation of new user account, one more 
step is of outmost importance. All user passwords 
must be stored using the reverse encryption process. 
This option, located in user account properties, 
Account tab, shown in the Fig. 6, must be turned on in 
order to interpret received password from Network 
Policy Server. 
9. NETWORK POLICY SERVER 
CONFIGURATION 
There are certain steps one should follow when 
configuring Network Policy Server. First and most 
important is to add new RADIUS client, so the Server 
may expect RADIUS messages from that IP 
addresses.  
Fig. 7 illustrates setup steps for one new client, 
with friendly name WiFi M1. Its IP address is entered 
and shared secret which has to be the same as in 
CoovaAP firmware. This is the password AP and NPS 
uses to identify themselves.  
One final step is to create network policy that will 
allow only members of one Active Directory group to 
be authenticated. Fig. 8 illustrates creation of one 
network policy that does that. Also, regarding the 
Figure 7. Adding New Client in NPS 
 
Figure 8. Network Policy Creation 
 
 
authentication method used, only CHAP should be 
enabled, and not PAP, MS-CHAP and MS-CHAP v2. 
This should conclude the configuration process. 
After this, if everything is done right, user credentials 
will be forwarded do NPS which acts as middleware 
between access point and backend Active Directory 
Server.  
 
10. CONCLUSION 
Although user identification process looks like very 
simple task it is far beyond that. Without the use of 
expensive third party applications, and along with 
difficulties of incorporating this system into existing 
network infrastructure, it requires lots of man hours to 
make it work. Numerous different configurations 
exist, and are followed with numerous problems. This 
paper is intended to help implement user 
authentication in public networks where diversity in 
Operating Systems and client programs is strongly 
encouraged.  
 Proposed implementation clarifies the setup 
configuration in public environment where user 
accounts are stored in Microsoft Active Directory 
2008, and authentication is done by using Network 
Policy Server. The idea was to unify the login process 
so it’ll be platform independent. Even though the 
credentials check process is done exclusively by 
Microsoft Software, Access Points use GPL Linux 
Software and solution for credential forwarding is 
proposed in a form of CoovaAP firmware. Another 
optimization is the existence of embedded Captive 
Portal on Access Point which increases efficiency by 
removing web server from equation. 
This configuration gives more flexibility to 
RADIUS as de facto standard in user Authentication, 
Authorization and Accounting. Combined with new 
powerful solutions implemented in Microsoft 
Windows 2008 Server, authentication of wireless 
users will become more secure, easier to implement 
and faster. 
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